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PREFACE
This paper documents the findings of a survey to determine the military implica-
tions of the Satellite Power System and to identify worthwhile study tasks that
could be completed during fiscal year 1979.
V
aEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study was conducted to examine military implications of the NASA
Reference Satellite Power System (SPS)* and to identify important military-
related study tasks that could be completed during fiscal year 1979. Primary
areas of investigation were the potential ob the SPS as a weapon, for supporting
U.S. military preparedness and for affecting international relations. In addition,
the SPS's relative vulnerability to overt military action, terrorist attacks, and
sabotage was considered.
The SPS could act as an electronic warfc..e weapon and, with modification,
as a marginally effective energy-beaming weapon. The system could support
military preparedness by providing energy for a strong and stable U.S. economy
and by providing a powered platform for military systems, system segments,
and operations.
The SPS would be vulnerable to military action, terrorism and sabotage
unless hardened against these attacks by design, security, and a self-defense
system. Because space is an international resource, military use of the SPS,
even to protect itself, may have an adverse impact on the relations of the United
States with other nations.
Tasks identified for completion in fiscal year 1979 include (a) a detailed
vulnerability study, (b) evaluation of an SPS self-defense system concept, (c)
determination of the effect of SPS flexibility to deliver different sized electrical
loads on the ability to gain SPS support from individual nations, and (d) investi-
gation of the effect of SPS deployment schedule on obtaining needed agreements,
providing security, and controlling risks of armed conflict. A fifth and !Ong-term
task would consist of a worldwide survey identifying military imrlit-ations of
the SPS that result from the specific requirements of potential SPS power customers.
*See table 2.1.	 vii
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I. INTROC.iUCTION
The U.S. Deportment of Energy (DOE) and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) are investigating a potential new source of energy
called the Satellite Power System (SPS)J/ The SPS concept involves placing
in orbit around the earth satellites equipped with large solar arrays. The arrays
collect solar radiation from the sun (approximately 99 percent of the time), which
is then converted to electromagnetic radiation and beamed by a transmission
system located on the satellites to receiving/conversion stations on the ground.
The receiving equipment at the conversion static i changes the electromagnetic
radiation, to electricity that can be fed directly nto the utility network. The
satellite and receiving antenna/rectifier (recter t , a), for the current NASA2/ refer-
ence system using solar cells, and microwave power transmission subsystems
are approximately 50 and 100 sq. km in size, resp -ctively. The system is designed
so that each rectenna will provide power to the itility grid. The scope of the
concept can be placed in perspective by considering that the generating cc; ocity
of these satellites would be equal to all the electrical power generated in the
United States in 1975. Projected energy demand at the turn of the century, as
well as basic economics, indicate that at least 60 satellites will need to be programmed.
Such a system is anticipated to have far-reaching impacts on society.
The SPS will have many features in common with systems of past and current
space programs and will build on the technology that these programs have created.
System development, production, and deployment will be coGtly processes, and
SPS relative productiveness will be relied on to place it within the cost feasibility
range. Lightweight structures and equipment and reliable operation, made possible
by the favorable environment of space and design for the market, may hold the
secrets to the needed cost control. If it is believed that the SPS will fulfill its
postulated role by becoming a supplier of a significant part of the total energy
consumed in the United States at some time during the first half of the twenty-
first century, then SPS development, production, and deployed assets are valuable
to both civilian and military segments of our nation now and in the forseeable
future. Furthermore, if the United States decides to depend on the SPS for so
great a part of its total energy supply, the systern must be seCL , re. Some believe
that the SPS cannot be defended successfully, but that if it could be, this defense
would cost more than the SPS.
The investment of materials, effort, and money to fill the energy gap in
the time available will be large but finite. Spending a large part of these resources
on the development and deployment of a system that is superior from the standpoints
of technological, economical, and environmental risks and yet is militarily inde-
fensible actually may be squandering the resources. What is worse, however,
is that these resources (and valuable time) then are denied to the alternative
"runner-up" energy system concept that (though inferior in some respects) is
acceptable and militarily defensible. This study has been performed to determine
what role, if any, the SPS has in the U.S. military posture. Tasks includes' the
following:
•
	
	 Investigation of the SPS potential as a weapon or other supportive
element of U.S. military preparedness;
•	 Investigation of the potential for impacts on international relations;
•
	
	 Investigation of the relative vulnerability to overt military action,
terrorist attacks, or sabotage; and
•	 Identification of questions needing further study.
2
1 I. SURVEY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RELATED WORK
The survey for unclassified relevant literature and information on related
work has included a Defense Documentation Center search, a search of We open
literature, and conferences and contacts with representatives of the Department
of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), and industrial organizations and individuals
acting in a private capacity. During this survey it was learned that several efforts
have included the consirieration and documentation of the general topic of military
activities in space. Examples include references 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. However,
with the exception of reference 6, no effort has been made to summarize this
work because these reports and papers are readily available. Some of *he pertinent
information contained in reference 6 concerning laws and treaties is summarized
by Nor. Leonard Uavid in appendix A.
The potentia- of the Satellite Power Systern (SPS) to function as a weapon,
support U.S. rnilitary preparedness, and affect international relations and SPS
vulnerability, are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.1 WEAPON AND MILITARY PREPAREDrJESS h iPLICATIUNS
Civilian space systems, like military space systerns, are bcsed on current
technology; therefore, the systems provided by NASA and DOU would be expected
to have many common features, several of which could implicate the SPS militarily.
In 1958, shortly otter the Sputnik la,inch, NASA 8/
 was formers from the old Notional
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and from selected individuals and
groups performing DUD space-related work. Proje :i transferred to NASA included
project Vanguard and certain lunar probes and rocket engine programs. The tonnation
of joint committees of i4ASA and military personnel to pursue common objectives
and the free rnovenient of worKers (even the astronauts) Between rnilitar," and
NASA space projects tend to promote similarities between NASA and military
space efforts and equipment. Therefore, it does not seem inappropriate to consider
the question of military implications of a civilian space system.
2J.1 Weapon Implications
Use of the SPS as a weapon is a major concern. U.S. r itizens as well us
foreign governMents and their citizens will want to know whether the power
transmission beams can open ite as weapons and what assurances can be provided
that this 5 giynwatts of power will riot be used cis a weapon. The weapons i'llplic'.01011
of the I'AMA reference SPS (table 2.1) is exornined.
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Table 2.1 Summary of SPS Reference System Concept
Generating Capacity
•	 S GW DC output per SPS unit at the utility interface
Operational Characteristics
e	 Flat solar array with transmitting antenna on one end
•	 Power collection at GEO
Energy Conversion
e
	
	 Photovoltaic—single-crysral gallium aluminum arsenide or single-
crystal silicon
Power Transmission
e	 Microwave, phased-array transm' t : ing antenna, klystron power ampli-
fiers and slotted waveguide rod` 	 elements
Structural Material
e	 Graphite composite
R ectenno
e	 Subarray panel with -8 km 2 active element area
Space Construction
e	 Construction at GEO
Space Transportation
e
	
	
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle !,HLLV)—two-staae, vertical launch, winged,
horizontal land-landing, reusable vehicles with 400 metric ton payload
to low earth orbit
e
	
	 Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV)—modified Space Shuttle orbiter with
passenger module
•
	
	 Cargo Orbital Transfer Vehicle (CO TV)— independent reusable electric-
powered vehicle
0
	
	 Personnel Orbital Transfer Vehicle (POTV)--two-stage, reusable chemi-
cal fuel vehicle
Earth Launch Site
e	 Kennedy Space Center pending further study
4
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2.1.1.1
	 Microwave Power Transmission Subsystem (MPTS)
The MPTS is the transmission subsystem used in 'he current NASA reference
SPS concept. The system, to be constructed and deployed in geostationary earth
orbit (GEO), will Ee ,p owered by a solar cell array having a platform of approxi-
mately SS sq. km . Tuble 2.2 provides MPTS details?/ from which ;` foi`.owing
observations can be made:
	
•	 The system radiates a large amount of power.
	
•	 Power density at its highest level nets the center of the antenna is
a relatively low 2.2 W/cm 2 (approximately 16 solar constants), from
which workers near the antenna can be shielded for short periods
of tinie. (Figure 2.1 is a plot of maximum power density versus distance
from the antenna toward the ground receiver.)
	
•	 There should be no trouble designing spacecraft that can travel in
this beam with passengers aboard. Spacecraft or satellites not designed
for this radiation field could overheat when moving ;lowly through
ita—/
 resulting in temporary disability or permanent damage to their
electronic systems.
Two possibilities exist for weapon use. First, the bccm could be defocused
and noise introduced to render se!ected communications ineffective (an electronic
warfare weapon). Second, the beam could be directed at ground targets or scanned
in a manner to follow spacecraft until overheating occurs, and/or until electronic
failure Jisables the craft or produce- a mission abort.
2.1.2 U.S. Military Preparedness Implications
The energy problem of the DOD was defined in the January 1977 U.S. Navy
Energy  PIan9/ as f of l ows:
The most serious and pervasive threat to long-term national stability is
the growing world inadequacy of assured energy resources to support world
needs. National security depends on maintaining o wor !,Iwide balance of
the distribution of energy resources. Notional security objectives can be
achieved only if the United States is thoroughly prepared to meet essential
industrial and military energy requirements. Attaining these objectives,
deterring armed conflict, producing modern weapons systerns, cnd maintaining
the overall : eadiness of the U.S. military are all keyed to uninterrupted
energy supplies.
°-/ A radiation level as high as 1.5 W/crn 2 is permitted for aircraft. H:,,4,
speed circraft flying at low altitude are able to dissipate radiatiai loads several
times this value. (In space there is no air flow across spacecraft surfaces to
cool there. Therefore, the radiant heat of the beam must be rejected by tyre
use of reflective surfaces and/or absorption and reradiati(n.)
,a
Table 2.2 Microwave Power Transmission Subsystem Parameters
•	 Frequency 2.45 GHz
•	 Wavelength = 12.2 cm
•	 Output Power to Power Grid = 5 GW
•	 Transmit Array Size = I km in diameter, 13.4 x 10 6 kg mass
•	 Power Radiated from Transmit Array = 6.85 ^N
•	 MPTS Efficiency = 6;.1 percent
•	 Phase Control System: An active retrodirective array with a pilot beam
reference for providing phase conjugation. This system includes:
-	 Phase Lock Loop Around Each Tube for Phase Stability and Noise
Suppression
-	 Double Sideband, Suppressed Carrie- Modulation (Two-Pilot Frequencies)
-	 Coding of Pilot Beam for Security d Pilot Discrimination
-	 Ground Safety Control System (Ground Sensors for Interpreting Benin
Shape)
-	 Power Density Levels
Center of Transmit Antenna = 22 kW/m 2 = 2.2 W/cm2
Edge of Transmit Antenna = 2.4 kW/m 2
 = 240 mW/cm2
Gender of Rectenno = 23 mW/cm2
Edge of Rectenna = I mW/cm2
-	 Rec:tenno Size = 10.0 km x 12.4 km
-	 Beam Diameter = 2.8 x 10 -4 rod
-	 Pointing Held to + 2.8 x 10 -6 ran
6
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The major U.S. r„ilitery preparedness implications of the SPS result from its
ability to supply energy. The embargo on the export of petroleum products to
selected countries in October of 1973 by the OPEC nations, and the realization
that petroleum is a limited resource, have placed a high national priority on energy
and energy-related issues. Objectives have been a:tablished to:
•	 Cunserve energy;
•	 Increase domestic oil and gas production while reducing the use of
oil and gas;
•	 Convert oil and gas electric plants to other fuels, such as coal, hydro,
nuclear, solar;
•	 Develop the inexhaustible energy resources;
•	 Reduce oil imports; and
•	 Develop a billion barrel petroleum reserve.
The embargo has pointed out to the military the necessity of having a reliable
source for each form of energy or fuel that it uses and has caused accelerated
energy planning. Military bases, for example, have introduced programs to supply
much of their own energy requirements and to reduce their dependence on outside
sources.
These basic energy availability and use issues implicate the "PS in U.S.
military preparedness. Many in the military community who have surveyed the
problem believe that the United States will begin to be affected by the fuel short-
age by 1985 or 1990; costs are already reducing fuel availability to some of the
population. The power expected from the SPS cannot relieve these early shortages
directly, but its imminence may encourage a freer flow of oil into the market,
thereby keeping a bad situation from becoming intolerable.b/
If the SPS comes on line, its power can begin to be used in the following
ways:
•	 Strengthen the civilian/industrial sector, allowing more effective
support to the military in the areas of technology, production, and
capi tal;
•	 Free larger quantities of portable fuels required for military mobility
(and mobility related stockpiling);
b/ Dr. William Shurcliff has pointed out that the encouragement of a freer
flow (and use) of oil, with the prospects of an SPS that in fact does not come
on line, could hasten and intensify the ultimate energy bind.
8
,A
•	 1
•	 Provide electricity to military ground installations through the utilities;
and
•	 Supply markets that will strengthen mutual security bands and reduce
tensions.
The current plan is to deploy two 5-GW SPS units each year starting in the year
2000 and running through the year 2030 for a total SPS output of 300 GW. This
is equivalent to the 1975 electrical power generating capacity in the United States
and from 7.5 to 10.0 percent of the expected U.S. power requirement in 2030.
(Other scenarios have projected the SPS deployment rate at two times to approxi-
rnately four times this rate.)
Any growing dependence of the United States on an unfolding and successful
SPS for power, coupled with the constant dependence of military preparedness
on an economically and industrially strong United States, will implicate the SPS
in U.S. military preparedness. However, the implication goes farther; the SPS
must be protected by either the U.S. military or a military/quasi-military force
in which the United States plays a part commensurate with its potential for loss.
2.1.3 Platform for Weapons
The NASA 5-GW SPS reference design is driven by a solar cell array with
an area of approximately 50 sq. km .?/
 This array is supported by a platform
that is 10,400 m long, 5,200 m wide, and 470 m thick—a volume of approximately
25 cu km. Materials used in this platform and its design combine for an extremely
lightweight structure having the appropriate stiffness for SPS functions. This
platform, as well as SPS construction/maintenance facilities and personnel living
quarters would seem from a cursory examination to be ideal assets for beginning
any necessary SPS military operations. Military housing and work areas could
be integrated into the SPS solar array platform by modifying and beefing up struc-
tures as required. The array could be extended to supply any added quantities
of ei.. i, icity needed by the military unit. During times of conflicts /
 the array
would be a prodigious source of power that could he preempted from the private
sector and used to power weapons. The functions of such a military outpost could
include security, supply, maintenance, repair, personnel, and training.
Security would encompass activities involving the maintenance and use
of defensive/offensive equipment needed to protect the SPS. Systems could include
^/ During a national emergency (declared by the president) civil and commer-
ciol satellites would be subject to control by the `department of Defense. See
appendix A, PRM-23.
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visible/infrared/rador sensors for reconnaissance, si+_ .-JIlance, and search/track/-
pointing; radiation/particle weapons; projectiles and missiles; communications/com-
mand/control; data-handling electronics; and electronic warfare/countermeasures
equipment. A recent study by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company 10/
investigated the evolutionary development of a space station to support people
and equipment engaged in peaceful pursuits. Many of the same problems they
encountered would need to be solved in developing and equipping the SPS military
outpost. The shuttle transportation system is used to support the McDonnell
Douglas space station concept.
Major technologies (including surveillance, detection, track, pointing, and
laser weaponsd/
 and missiles) for beginning any needed self-defense system for
the SPS and for deploying other weapons at the SPS space site are progressing
steadily. However, before an appropriately equipped operational SPS self-defense
system can be defined, an understanding of the threat, the output of operational
analyses involving this threat, and the feel of experience may need to be combined
for an extended operational shakedown of potential system elements. This suggests
the possible usefulness of early experience with a system that may supply only
modest amounts of power compared to the 5 GW of the NASA reference system.
2.2 IMPACTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
2.2.1 SPS Security/ Weapons
The potential value of the SPS to our industrial capability and national
economic system arises from the fact that by 2030 the SPS may be filling a signifi-
cant part of the U.S. electrical power needs. Any attack, on this high-valued
asset by a major force would be considered an attack that flies in the face of
the U.S. strategic deterrent force. Such an attack could mean that strategic
deterrence had failed 3/ and would lead the United States into decisions and actions
involving the very weapons and forces that should have prevented attack but
did not. 7'lese risks to the SPS and to strategic deterrence might be ameliorated
by internationalizing the system and/or by reaching agreements declaring the
SPS off-limits for military action. SPS strengthening (which may include a self-
defense system) could be made a part of the SPS to discourage and defend against
small, unsophisticated attacks./
 In the beginning, it will be difficult to determine
d/ Information from the DARPA high-energh-laser space defense program
would be helpful in projecting loser weapons capabilities and in defining approaches.
10
what the extent of any SPS defense system should be. It could start small and
expand to fit the need as requirements are developed. At present, space law
contains nothing to prevent the United States from stationing parts of its strategic
deterrent system (and f orces) at the SPS space site, as long as these parts do
not include nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. l/ Growth of a
defended SPS may tend to be limited by the fact that as the military capability
increases, the value of the already high-valued target becomes even higher.
2.2.2 Agreements/Disputes
World communications have progressed to the point that populations in
all parts of the world are becoming aware of resources, (such as solar flux, electro-
magnetic spectrum, and geostationary orbit) and want to share in their exploitation.
The elctromagnetic spectrum and the geostationary _orth orbit are limited resources.
The breadth of the useful electromagnetic spectrum, limited by equipment perfor-
mance, has increased significantly with the widespread development of ultraviolet,
visible, and infrared systems. However, in many regions of the spectrum, particu-
larly the microwave region, bandwidth is a carefully controlled, highly coveted
commodity. In the allotment of bandwidth, extreme care is exercised to ensure
that the assignment is in the public interest and will +tot be used in a manner
that interferes with equipments on the some band or operating in other bands.
For this reason, the use of any frequency/bandwidth used by the SPS will likely
need to be cleared through an international organization.
The geostationary orbit, because of its special characteristics, is a limited
resource (there is only one around the earth). The number of slots available in
this orbit for communication satellites, if collisions are to be prevented and occul-
tations and radio interference avoided, has been bounded by the range of 180
to 1800.3/ The number of satellites now using geosynchronous orbit is large (approxi-
mately 100) and growing. This growth in operating systerns and the difficulty
anticipated in reserving bandwidth for systems that are not scheduled should
combine to expedite both the planning of SPS development and deployment schedules
and an early determination of bandwidth requirements. The solar flux in space
is not a limited resource but a flow of radiation that is continuous. However,
the solar flux that can be intercepted in the geostationary orbit may have a practi-
cal limit. Figure 2.2 is a projection of the surface of the earth that shows sorne
of the countries which a piece of the GEO path passing through their "extended
air space"; the United States is not one of these countries. Sat.-Wltes to serve
the United States n--ed to be placed over South America (where Gi_O passes over
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil) and to the west as shown.
w '
9	 1
_••
/	 !l/i
•,	 Q
W
i	 /	 Q	 •
o0WJ
W
V 6
%X ZZ
Q
I
wz
 Oz
O
i	 a
	
J	 iW	 J
N	 W	 QW	 W	
m	
MH
►^ N	 v	 ^^
	
H ^ ^A /+^	 m ^	 O	 U
O / ¢ r a
•^ O	 it
	
O	 p G
	
x	 D
V1	 /
	
^^	 vJ	 O LU C
\	 \	 2 ;o W
LL.— e	 0 6 2
\	 v
_o—
p z
 t
` L z {}
^'F
t \A O2
QU
^^ a
r
0
M
Q
a
D
n
W
1
MR
°
C C
oo -cg
vi C,Cwv N
4-
° u
3
_O
E
O ►:
E C
N .-
u y C c
p t c O O
v
v v
•3^' v hcap^,
Z
O
E
N
0 o ^
O N
E^
^^ ^ vim= •^v
O U ^- }O v 0.0cn
E
N N
C
•• J O N
cu 4-°a
NCc u^^
Q H O — ^- > O C w
c(U ; '>cn	 c o v vi
°E Oa LOcc°u o^
v
o ^
uY
L
_U N
-c	 3:
S
>
^j o o
v y
~
N ^. ^^L
CU > Z o•°-' t3Ln o^Q W } N•C Ohs G
N O c w.. _O O
d+ :
^; ^- J .-,O o	
3 C
•-	 c
—cu
^ v'
Q
E
E	 ^,
;ri O O —v
LL
N } >o^vO
u^^ ^
0c C L c xcu Z
Z °c ', > "-!o
^-
°°vs^ °po^
U N
JEo^,o
- U
J ^O i 0 u
c
O	 O
Y
r-• 0 N C o
V v a0JJ	 y ao	 Eo vNuQ
JJ
Z
12
To obtain the necessary bandwidth and orbit slots needed for U.S. power,
it may be necessary to establish an international organization to design, produce,
deploy, and operate an SPS that would provide power to all countries of North,
Central and South Arnerica. the some organization might be able to create and
support any military or civilian force needed to provide SPS protection. This
organization cnuld also include countries located in other parts of the world,
as long as orbit slots and bandwidth are available on a "local" basis and other
conditions of any agreements are met.e/
Most of the world's developing countries ure located between 300 N. and
300
 S. latitude, the region of the globe that is inosi easily served by an SPS from
GEO. Many of these countries are small and have relatively small power demands.
Countries in this region currently do not present a threat to the United States;
however, within the time required to deploy the SPS, this situation could change--
particularly if one or more of these countries became allied with a larger country
(U.S. adversary) and became a staging area(s) for it. It is also possible that SPS
power, once available, could reverse the industrial and economic trends of some
of these countries, allowing them to become real and significant partners or adver-
saries.
2.3 RELATIVE VULNERABILITY
The vulnerability of the SPS to disruptive groups or to rnilitary forces is
believed to be greater than for terrestrial electric power systems. Terrestrial
systems are vulnerable to (a) air- and ground-delivered ordinance by military
or terrorist groups, (b) military or terrorist groups that could take over operations,
and (c) saboteurs within the SPS/utilities and support organizations. The systems
are vulnerable at the generating site, in the power distribution system, and in
the lines of supply3/
 for fuel, spare parts, and other operating items. The power
distribution and supply systems lend themselves to covert kinds of activity (sorne-
tirnes part of a larger activity) that con precede open confrontation. The vulner-
ability of the rectenna site and the distribution systern of the SPS is expected
to be similar to that of terrestrial systerns, except that the supply lines for the
SPS do not deliver fuel to the ,ectenno. "Fuel" is supplied to the rectenna via
a bearn from the satellite in geosynchronous orbit. Therefore, on the basis of
e/
 Several questions needing answers are: Should the organization include
only friendly nations, or both friendly and not-so-friendly nations? What about
the strategic arms limitations treaties? What part can onsite inspections play'?
What about questions of technology transfer?
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a first-order evaluation, the relative vulnerability of the SPS to that of a terres-
trial system reduces to a comparison of the vulnerability of the spaceborne parts
of the SPS (and launch sites) to the vulnerability of the terrestrial system's fuel
supply line(s).
The spaceborne segment of the SPS will be vulnerable to military attack
and to the activities of sabotuers. Vulnerability to terrorist attacks is not likely
for some time because such attacks would require the use of either a high-technol-
ogy space transportation system or sophisticated ground-based equipment capable
of destroying a target 36,000 km away. Launch sites are vulnerable in much
the same way as the terrestrial power plants except that security probably would
be better at the launch sites.
There is likely to be at least a norninal effort to harden the satellite compo-
nents and space transportation units against the hits and explosions of a military
attack and the resulting environment. Hardening may be needed against interceptor
and satellite killer impacts and explosions, nuclear radiation, high-energy laser
and particle weapons, and electronic warfare waged to obstruct the flow of radiation
or to compromise and/or gain control of satellite functions. Passive hardening
is unlikely to be effective in all these areas; therefore, it is believed that depend-
able hardening against military attack will necessarily include an active SPS
self-defense system unless other assets capable of defending the SPS are available
for this function at the time of SPS deployment (see appendix B).
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I 1 I. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Several major military implications were identified during the survey of
relevant literature and related work. Results of an analysis of these implications
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.1 WEAPON AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS IMPLICATIONS
The Satellite Power System (,SPS` is designed to provide power for peaceful
pursuits. As the SPS grows and is retied on by the United States as one of its
prime sources of power, it will become a potential military target. Its significance
as a potential target will grow in relation to the increasing power demands that
it fills.  Issues concerning the SPS as a weapon and/or a base for weapons, and
as a source for fuel to the military, will need to be considered when scheduling
its development and deployment.
3. 1.1 Weapon Considerations
As discussed previously, the SPS can be used as an electronic warfare weapon,
an energy-beaming weapon, and a powered platform for weapons and weapon
system segments.
	
3.1-1.1
	
Eleci:anic Warfare Weapon
`uring ncrrnal operation of the Microwave Power Transmission Subsystem
(MPTS), noise could be introduced to discriminate against or to render ineffective
transmi&c ions in selected bonds. During hostile periods, the beam could be defo-
cused in offect a larger area; selected communications or other transmissions
over an enfi,e hemisphere cc -!d he degraded or blocked. Friendly forces having
control of the beam could control noise content, beam spread, and times of noise
transrr!i:.s;on.s. Microwave densities, from the defocused microwave beam, though
significant when compared with the sensitivities of many microwave receivers,
would be tolerable in terms of the levels (short-term and intermittent) that would
be detrimental to health and the public welfare. For example, the microwave
power from one 5-GW SPS radiated evenly over the projected area of on-, earth
hemisphere results in a density of approximately 5 x 10 -5 W/m2.
	
3.1.1.2	 Energy-Beaming Weapon
The familiarity of the general public with the concepts of high-energy laser
(and particle) beams and their frequently cited ability to distribute deadliness
and/or destruction has raised the question of the potential use of SPS power beams
as weapons. For ex,3mple, a target in a circular orbit below and 10,000 km from
.+ .
4
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the SPS traveling in the some dir%ction of the SPS will have a velocity relative
to the beam at the point of crossing of 1.16 km/sec (and 5.65 km/sec for a retro-
grade orbit). From the position of the SPS, these relative velocities represent
angular rates of 0.116 and 0.585 mrad/sec, respectively. To follow a target of
the lower angular rate a beam would have to be rotated about its origin at a rate
of 3600 in 895 minutes (0.4 degrees per minute), and the higher rate 2.0 degrees
per minute. In orbits 1000 km below the SPS, these rates would be 0.36 to 20.7
degrees per minute. The angular rates of maneuvering targets or satellites in
retrograde orbits at close range generally would be expected to exceed the track
capabilities that could be designed into the MPTS. Targets traveling toward
the SPS could be followed at much slower slew rates except at close range when
a miss or "fly-by" is involved (see figure 3.1). The effectiveness of an energy-
beaming weapon depends on the power in the beam, the beam intensity versus
time profile, the angular cross-section of the beam, required beam xceleration
and slew rates, and the accuracy to which a target can be tracked and the beam
pointed. The tracking/pointing error of a system against a moving target (h?gh
information rate required) will usually be significantly greater than the error
of that same system against a stationary or nearly stationary target (under mech-
anically damped low information rate conditions).
3.1.1.2.1	 Microwave System
The accuracy to which the microwave beam of the reference design can
be pointed toward the rectenna site (table 2.0 is considered adequate for a "weapon
mode" if this accuracy could be maintained during target track. The antenna,
a low-density structure, is large and massive but probably could be used to track
nonmoneuvering orbital targets at rates of one or so mrad/sec, provided target
detection and/or designation is completed early enough to allow the antenna
to be brought on target moving at the appropriate rate without exceeding accelera-
tion limits as established by antenna structural characteristics and figure require-
ments. Figure tolerances may be as stringent as one tenth the wavelength
(+O.la - + 1.22 cm) for a frequency of 2.45 GHz. From figure 2.1, it is only after
a target has closed to within 12,000 km that irradiance on target is greater than
one solar constant. Therefore, use of the microwave system in geostationary
orbit (GEO) against earth and near-earth targets does not seem practical. However,
at ranges of 4,000 km or less, the rate of temperature rise for highly absorptive
targets being irradiated could be significant, causing a damaging heat huildup.
i!
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It would be possible to increase the energy density on target and thus Improve
weapon capability by equipping the antenna with higher frequency transmitting
units to be used during the weapon mode. Figure 3.2 is a plot of gain (G) in peak
power on target versus frequency. (Curve is normalized to 2.45 GHz.) Assuming
equal efficiency, power on target (using the I-km diameter antenna structure)
can be increased by a factor of 100, for example, by increasing the transmitting
frequency to 24.50 GHz. f/ This would reduce bean diameter by a factor of 10,
but would decrease figure tolerances, and also decrease the track error allowed
by factors of 10.
The smaller, higher frequency transmitting units incorporating electronic
scan would handle less power and thus would have to be used in greater numbers
than the 2.45-GHz units, and the finer figure tolerances would be expected to
require a beefed-up antenna structure. The increased number of transmit modules
will result in more complex phasing circuits and the refined tracking accuracy
will require more sophisticated track circuits and pointing controls. During operc-
tion in the weapon mode, power from the array would be switched from the 2.45-
GHz klystrons to the higher frequency transmit units. These additions and modifi-
cations to the 2.45-GHz MPTS would increase its weight and cost significantly.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears that the microwave system operating
at 2.45 GHz would be relatively ineffective as an energy-beaming weapon, whereas
use of shorter wavelength transmitting units and the large 1-km diameter antenna
would provide marginally effective results. The cost for either design based
on weapon effectiveness probably would be prohibitive, except that with an operating
SPS, a large pc , t of the required equipment is already in place. Further study
of the weapon potential of the MP15 is needed to identify specifically the feasi-
bility issues and to estimate cost deltas.
3.1.1.2.2
	
Base for Weapons/Military Operations
The SPS satellite's location at UO, it-, size, and the electric power that
probably will be available at the site could Make it an excellent location for a
lookout post and far the deployment of energy-intensive weapons. However,
for the lookout function to have greatest value, the satellite must be stationed
over the right areas. S •ationing such c satellite over the Indian Ocean near the
U.S.S.R. or adjucent to other adversary nations without benefit of previous mutual
agreements, would likely be provocative. An SPS in (,FO i,c,ed as a base for weapons,
t -T Higher frequencies also should c)e practical.
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1 1
weapon system segments, and their integration into military operational scenarios
will be a high-value target and vulnerable to attack, except as this vulnerability
is reduced by U.S. strategic deterrence and the SPS self-defense system and/or
a space defense system of more generalized capabilities. The deterrent concept
is good until it fails, but in any case can provide added time, if needed, for self-
defense system development.
The SPS structure may not represent an optimum location for some electronic
systems because of the RFI/EfVd problems that would result from operation of
the SPS Power Transmission Subsystem (PTS) and the electric currents associated
with the electrical power transmission system that is part of the solar array.
The firing of projectiles or launching of missiles from the array platform depending
on launch method could impart a velocity delta. Rotational and/or lateral velocities,
contributed in this manner, would have to be compensated for by the SPS orientation
and station-keeping system.
These and other questions concerning the SPS self-protection system and
use of the SPS as a platform for other weapons and as a support to U.S. military
operations should be investigated in detail to determine technology problems,
provable costs, schedules, and values and risks of these weapons and activities
to the SPS itself and to international stability.
3.1.2 Preparedness
The SPS could be made to contribute to military preparedness by incorporating
into its design a weapon mode, by serving as a base for additional weapons and
military aperations, and by supplying power. The SPS could (1) contribute energy
to U.S. activities and industry for e ' -ig and productive economy, (2) provide
power to friendly and adversar y COMITY es where this promotes U.S. interests
and a favorable international stability, (3) supply power to the military, and (4)
substitute electricity for portable fuels that then could be released to the U.S.
military. The extent to which all these purposes could be served would depend
on policy decisions and the SPS's flexibility to service the variety of demands
that .nake up the potential market for SPS power. In discussions with military
representatives regarding military preparedness and SPS defense, the following
cornme,-Js/issues were raised:
•	 The military is concerned about the availability of energy and would
use direct SPS power for bate operntio.
-Is. T :-.e
 Army mj/ be interested
in providing (I) the acreage needed for ;,table ground powe ,
 conversion
sites c.nd (2) ground security.
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•	 Scheduling early, smaller SPS systems will provide operational experience
and a;low defense requirements to be worked out incrementally (if
defense is possible) before large SPS funding commitments are made.
9	 The VOU should be brought into system planning and development
as early as possible to support the identification of defensehnintary
related issues and be ready to initiate any R&D required to resolve
these issues.
3.2 IMPACTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The impacts of the SPS on international relations will be both positive and
negative. They will include weapons; military impacts, impacts related to the
allotment of the rights to frequency and orbit resources, and impacts that result
from large quantities of SPS power being made available for use, export, and
control. It is probable that there will be SPS-related disputes to resolve, agree-
ments to forge, and international organizing to do for some time to come.
3.2.1 Weapons Impacts
both the severity of the weapons impacts on internatir-;al relations and
SPS security will be related to the emphasis that is placed on weapons and military
activity at the space site. These impacts will be good or bad, depending on the
country in question and its own current self-centered interests. Freedom of space
as now recognized, just as freedom of the seas, allows property to be escorted
and protected ns required. This freedom and the limited restrictions (nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space) should permit the gradual
development and deployment of an effective and accepted SPS self-defense system.
Weapons that provide a military advantage to the nation(s) in control of
the SPS without introducing capabilities that tend toward weapon stability may,
through the creation of suspicion, fear, and actual vulnerability to those nations
not in control, accelerate the arms race.
3.2.2 Power Export/Power f_mborgoes
The large power production capability of an SPS developed and deployed
by the United States will provide a valuable export commodity provided that:
•	 The necessary agreements can be reached ensuring the United States
the required trequency, bandwidth, and orbit slots;
•	 The SPS is designed with a fiexiblity that allows it to serve export
den lands; and
•	 The necessary agreements can be reached involving assurances relating
to payments, reliability of power delivery (embargoes), and SPS system
security (transmitting and receiving sites) between export/import
countries.
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3.2.3 Internationalization
The more logical approach to developing and deploying the SPS from military
and security considerations may be to internationalize it from the beginning.
Security procedures could then be designed to distribute cost and responsibility
among the members of the association of nations formed to exploit the SPS concept.
The formation of such an association and the equitable distribution of costs, oppor-
tunities, and benefits should facilitate the forging of agreements to obtain needed
orbit slots and frequency assignments.
When considering the requirements and opportunities for agreements and/or
for internationalization of the SPS, several facts stand oui.
•	 From figure 2.2 it can be seen that the part of the geosynchronous
orbit that is of greatest interest to the United States is approximately
one-fourth of the orbit that passes over South America and west of
it.
•	 This location is on the other side of the world from the U.S.S.R. and
China. Military equipment (and forces) in space protecting SPS and
monitoring this region of the world should not cause a maximum level
of U.S.S.R./China concern.
•	 Although South and Central American countries would be easy targets,
they are not logical U.S. targets.
•	 The U.S.S.R. land mass is one of the least favorable locations with
respect to a satellite in geosynchronous orbit for receiving power.
The long atmospheric transmission paths and the oblique surface of the
earth at this location (relative to a line from GEO) may combine to make
SPS service to a large part of Russia marginal. A low earth orbit
(LEO) relay SPS may be of more interest to Russio.9/
3.3 RELATIVE VULNERABILITY
Communication satellites located in GEO are considered by some to be
vulnerable to direct ascent interceptors and to orbiting satellite killers. The
COMSAT's prime power, control, and electronic systems are also vulnerable to
nuclear radiation and to high-energy laser and particle-beam weapons. The SPS,
being much larger, is usually considered to be more vulnerable and, like the commu-
nication satellite, can be vulnerable to overt military attack in space and on
the ground. Actually its size may permit the use of such techniques as redundancy,
2/ The orbits used for this LEO SPS could be selected to satisfy both energy
distribution and military objectives.
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breakaway structures, placing of decoys of vital aim points at many places on
the structure, and other countermeasures to make the SPS less vulnerable than
a COMSAT. The large platform of the SPS will also allow the use of larger elec-
tronics that are more resistant to radiation such as bipolar devices for some elec-
tronics applications instead of the smaller, more vulnerable LSI semiconductor
circuits. L It will also allow some of the more sensitive components to be placed
beneath structure to avoid damage due to natural radiation or nuclear radiation
from a weapon or test explosion. Hardening against lasers, particle beams, and
missiles may be used to control damage and thus require an enemy to come within
range of an SPS self-defense system. The SPS transportation system will include
the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV), the Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV) and
the Cargo-and Personnel-Orbital-Transfer Vehicles (COTV and POTV). The vulnero-
bility of the personnel vehicles will be a function of vehicle hardening and life-
support system design, whereas the vulnerability of cargo vehicles will be a function
of the hardening techniques used, escort policy/capobilit-, and vehicle velocity
(trip duration). For more information concerning the impact of hostile environments
on the SPS, see appendix B.
The rectenna site is vulnerable to ordinary ground attack but probably can
be designed so that its performance degrades gracefully. Vulnerability can be
reduced by placing much of the power distribution and heavy power-handling
equipment underground at the rectenna site and by closely controlling design
and site layout data. Care given to the security aspects of the design (controls
and data handling/processing equipment) can reduce the risk of SPS equipment
takeover by hostile forces.
For the most part terrorist attacks will be limited to ground facilities.
Attacks could be launched against the rectenna site, ground-based space transpor-
tation facilities, power distribution system, and ground-based supply lines for
SPS materials and spares.
Terrorist attacks against SPS space assets are conceivable but probably
will not be important considerations until equipment such as higtrenergy laser
and/or particle-beam weapons can be acquired by such groups or until earth-space
transportation is commonplace. Sabotage of the system is more likely and can
occur on the ground or in space. Losses due to sabotage can be controller; through
internal security, employee screening, and the enforcement of harsh penalties
for sabotage at SPS, utility, and support organizations.
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IV. KEY ISSUES AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
During the study several key issues were identified and observations were
made concerning the military implications of the SPS. These are noted in the
following paragraphs.
4.1 WEAPON AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS IMPLICATIONS
As a weapon the microwave power transmission subsystem (NiPTS) may
have some applications as a noise generator in an electronic warfare role. Its
applications as an energy-beaming weapon are limited in the current NASA reference
system configuration because of the low-power density in the microwave beam
and the large massive antenna that would need to be moved to follow the target.
A geostationary (GEU) location of the NASA reference system maintains the
satellite and any weapons capability stationary over a single spot on earth.
i,iAitary preparedness will be supported by the SPS in the following ways:
•	 Strengthen the civilian/industrial sector allowing more effective tech-
nology, production, and capital support to the military;
•	 Free portable fuels required for military mobility (and stockpiling);
•	 Provide electricity to military ground installations through the utilities;
and
•	 Supply markets for electricity and thus strengthen mutual security
bonds and reduce tensions.
Large, powered, platforms for weapons can be provided by the SPS at several
different GEU locations. Weapons or weapon systems segments could include
sensors, communications, and laser/particle beam weapons; projectiles/missiles;
and electronic warfare and data-handling systems. The platform, reinforced
and modified, could be made to provide storage, housing, etc. This additional
mass would result in a larger load on the SPS station-keeping system.
Each deployment of modestly sized SPS's would provide operational experience
and allow any needed SPS defense system to start small and grow to be compatible
with risk. In this rnanner the ability of the SPS to be defended could be determined
before making large resource commitments.
4.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International relations could be affected as a result at:
•	 Disputes between nations with regard to the international agreements
that must be made concerning solar flux at GEU, frequency, orbit,
power export, security, etc.;
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•	 Possible requirements to place weapons in space to ensure the security
of the SPS; and
•	 Possible need to internationalize the SPS to reduce its vulnerability.
System deployment schedule and flexibility of service may affect the avail-
ability of frequency bands and orbit slots needed for the SPS, and flexibility of
SPS service available may determine the degree of interest among potential national
participants in an internationalized SPS.
4.3 VULNERABUTY
Vulnerability of the SPS relative to terrestrial systems is determined by
comparing the vulnerability of the spaceborne segment of the SPS and launch
sites with the vulnerability of the terrestrial system's fuel supply line(s).
•	 The spaceborne segment of the SPS is vulnerable to military adversaries
and to saboteurs;
•	 SPS defensive measures may need to include
--	 Hardening against nuclear radiation, laser/particle weapons,
and missiles, and
A self-defense system;
•	 Launch sites are expected to be vulnerable in approximately the some
manner as terrestrial plant sites, except that launch sites probably
will have better security.
•	 At ground rectenna sites it should be possible to use a redundant design,
arranging rectenna modules in parallel so that partial destruction
would only degrade rectenna performance. (Much of the cabling and
heavy equipment could be placed underground.)
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
5.1 SHORT-TERM TASKS
In conducting this study, four tasks were identified and are recommended
for completion in fiscal year 1979.
Task I would identify and assess areas of SPS vulnerability to military/quasi-
military actions and prepare SPS design guidelines to reduce this vulnerability.
Task 2 would prepare an SPS self-defense system concept and a plan for
its evaluation.
Task 3 would investigate the probable effect of the flexibility of the SPS
to deliver different sized loads on the ability to get individual nations to support
SPS. This support (or lack of it) should be related to the following:
•	 Prospects for internationalizing the SPS;
•	 SPS vulnerability to military attack; and
•	 International acceptance of an SPS self-defense system.
Task 4 would investigate the effect of the SPS deployment schedule on
the ability to (a) obtain international support and get needed agreements to allot
GEO solar flux, bandwidth, and orbit slots, and (b) plan, develop, and deploy an
adequate SPS defense system at a rate to reduce risks of confrontation and "space
war."
5.2 LONG-TERM TASK
A fifth task would be longer term designed to identify military implications
that result from the specific requirements of potential world customers for SPS
power. Information concerning customer requirements relating to participation,
timing, product, service and reliability of service would provide important data
to be used in designing a secure system. In addition, this task would contribute
significantly to the information base needed to promote the international interest
and cooperation leading to a militarily secure SPS.
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APPENDIX A
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
by
Leonard David, Program Director
Forum for the Advancement of
Students in Science and Technology (FASST)
Military Uses of Outer Space: The Legal Regime
The legality of military operations in space is set in several important docu-
ments. These would include: the 1958 NASA Space Act; the Treaty on Banning
Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water
(1963?; and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(1967). Due to the possible impact an SPS bean would have on the Earth's upper
atmosphere, the Convention on the Prohibition o f Hostile Uses of Environmental
Modification Techniques (1977) would also be affected.
Operations in outer space can be manifested in a number of ways. Among
these are the peaceful, aggressive, nonaggressive, and military uses of outer
space. Disagreement concerning what definitions apply to these words !^- been
the subject of discussion since the earliest days of space exploration.
The mewing "peoceful," occording to space law experts, gives rise to two
different interpretations. Under one interpretation, primarily used by the United
States, "peaceful" connotes "nonoggressive:' A second interpretation of the term
is "nonnilitay" and is used, although not exclusively, by the Soviet Union. In
addition, "peaceful" use has been applied to defense support space missions that
are "noninterferinq" or "nonaggres3ive:1(1, 2)
As stated in the Air Force Manual 1-1:(3)
The underlying goal of the U.S. national space policy is that the
medium of space must be preserved for peoceful use of all mankind.
Air Force principles relating to space operations are consistent
with this national commitment. National policy and international
treaties restrict the use of space for employm 	 f weapons of
mass destruction. There is, however, a need t. insure that no other
nation gains a strategic military advantage through the exploitation
of the space environment.
The possibility of an SPS linked to high powered laser could lead to a ballistic
missile defense capability. In addition, an SPS/laser system could be utilized
in a particle beam weapon, with lasers creating highly intense, coherent light
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sources to develop a reduced density channel, thereby enhancing particle beam
propagation. (4, S)
Such possibilities would have significant impact upon existing treaties between
the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile
systems. Signed parties have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems
or components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, cr mobile land-based.
However, suggestions have been made that aspects of the ABM Interim Agreements
and Agreed Interpretot i cns, can be interpreted ambiguously, perhaps allowing
research, development, and proof testing of space-based ABM systerns, short
of actual deployment.
Defensive/Offensive Use of Space
Space lawyer Andrew Holey once stated: (6)
...a nation is justified in protecting itself from attack no matter
where the staging area of the attack may be, including on the high
seas or in outer space, and a nation may cerry its defensive forces
to such areas. The great unresolved problem, so for as defensive
measures in space are concerned, is to translate the general recogni-
tion of this right of self-defense into some workable criteria for
distinguishing between the defen^:ve and offensive uses of space.
The fear of a technological, space-based "Pearl Harbor" has been r^ iterct d
in military literature. According to General Jacob Smart (retired): (7)
Despite wishful thinking to the contrary, man is and promises to
remaisi an aggressive, combative creature. We fear, we :late, we
fight one another. Until we remove causes of fear and hatred and
correct the conditions which prompt us to arm our.,elves, we have
no choice but to prepare to defend ourselves against attack in what-
ever form and through whatever media attacks ma y come. Today
and henceforth, the United States must be prepared to defend itself
against aggression in space and from space. We cannot surrender
the "high ground" without  contest.
Justifications for Military Activity in Space
Recent official speeches 8 clarify curr—it justification of the U.S. military
involvernent in the space medium. These or,::
•	 Uniqueness - some functions essentially can only be done from space,
such as near real-time warning of a ballistic missile attack
•	 Economi cs - some functions are more cheaply done from space, such
as long-haul communications
•	 Function effectiveness - some functions are more effectively done
rorn space, like meteorology
•	 Force effectiveness enhancemeot - some space functions can greatly
enhance the effectiveness o terrestrial forces.
t•,
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Denial of Access
With increased use by the military of space-based systems, a dependence
has been created. In turn, this dependence has Ind l o fears that an aggressor
nation "deny access to such systems:' Developr- :!nt of the limited anti-satellite
(ASAT) capability by the Soviets has jeopardized "the heretofore accepted sanctuary
of space," and now requires the "ability to protect satellites in space" as f undo-
mental "to defending the right of the United States and its allies to use of space
to achieve military advantage."(9)
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 00) also hcs testified to Congress that:
As the President has clearly stated, it would be preferable for both
sides to join in on an effective, and adequately verifiable ban on
antisatellite (ASAT) systems; we certainly have ne desire to engage
in a space weapons race. However, the Soviets with their present
capability are leaving us with little choice. Because of our growing
dependence on space systems we can hardly permit them to have
a dominant position in the ASAT realm.
Soviet ASAT capabilities, although still unable to reach geostationary orbit,
have produced studies by the U.S. military to develop special maneuvers for future
military sate!lites once in orbit to avert an*i-sate-llites. These maneuvers would
avert satellites that are capeble of (a) using pulverized aluminum particles to
form a "smokescreen;' protecting a satellite from laser yearns; (b) increasing
U.S. knowledge of the effects of pulsed laser radiation on solar ceas and sensors;
(c) using alternative power generation for spacecraft 'instead of vulnerable solar
cells and solar cell panels; and (d) renewing emphasis art 	 hardening of
delicate electronic payloads to counter possible high-altitude or space-environment
nuclear explosions.
The implicctions of verifying the results of these studies would include
adding weight to military payloads, pushing their weight to the upper limit of
Space Shuttle carrying caKcity. Investigations are now underway to upgrade
the Space Shuttle, allowing for heavier-than-expected cargo.
Public Support for the Space Peace/ War Potential
A Hudson Institute study has stated that fear of being second in space compe-
tition produces a number of social effects. According to the report, war remains
of paramount concern to the American public. Support of U.S. space activity
has been greatest when there was a linkage between the Cold War and space
competition. However, the report cautions that events, such as the launching
of the first satellite, the Soviet Sputnik 1, resulted in a tendency of the public
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...to bla-.P political aid governtnental officials for allowing the
Unite: States to fall behind a competitor. This kind of blame consti-
tvted,	 eff+-r,t, strong support for the space program--at least
;r a p.-riod when the public connected space issues to the Cold War.
Bro° ,-tirg second resulted in put,''.; questioning of U.S. military competence.
Do;s military activity irk space &t--r international cooperation? As stated
in a U.S. House of R. tp. °.:sentativcs report: (12)
The Defens:^ Department has suggested guidelines for the export
of U.S. technology under which maintenance of U.S. technological
,uperrivi ity by absolute control of design and manufacturing know-
^, vjw is considered ty DOD to be essential. All other considerations,
including international goodwill, are secondary under these guidelines,
5:ccording to DOD.
The report raises the following important questions: (12)
Because of the military potential of space technology, should sharing
of space technology come under these guidelines? Would maintenance
of U.S. technological leadership in space under these guidelines
be compatible with U.S. stated policy regarding international coopero--
tion in space? If maintenance of U.S. technological leadership
in space can only be achieved at the expense of international coopet a-
tion, which goal shall prevail?
Military Use of the Space Shuttle
Lt. Generui TI`omias W. Morgan, (13) Commender of the Space and Missile
Systems Organizations, AFSC, has stated that the Space Shuttle
...will open a new chapter of our national space program. It may
well make economically feasible for the first time whole new missions
in space - in addition to opening the door to better or cheaper ways
of performing traditional missions. I see the 1980's - the time in
which the STS (Space Transportation System) becomes a proved
quantity - as a time of major reappraisal of the role of space in
the Air Force Future.
Military/civilian space dependence on one vehicle, the Shuttle, has developed
a number of interesting policy problems. According j the Council of Economic
Priorities (CEP), (14)
because the DOD will be entirely dependent upon NASA's transportation
system for space launches, and because NASA is a small agency
in budget and iaborpower relative to the DOD, there is Aanger that
in the future, NASA programs will be oriented toward military,
rather than civilian and scientific uses.
The CEP feels that NASA could be pressured to restructure the U.S. space program
to f it DOD needs.
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The passibility exists that, upon operational status, the DOD will increase
its manned military activity via the Shuttle. Such a possibility may result in
procurement of a special DOD Space Shuttle. According to a report by a panel
of the National Academy of Public Administration, shifts in U.S. and Soviet rela-
tions could result in increased Defense expenditures. Such expenditures could
include establishment of a "...NASA-based civilian (and open) STO (Space Transpor-
tation Organization), and a DOD 'classified STO: „(15)
PR M - 23
Recently President Carter directed under a Presidential Review Memorandum
that the National Security Council Policy Review Committee examine existing
policy and formulate overall principles which should guide our space activities.
Principles were set forth in the Directive. 06) Of interest with regard to SPS
are the following:
The U.S. rejects any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over
celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations
on the fundcmentai right to acqui re da*o from space.
The United States holds that the space systems of any nation are
national property and have the right of passage through and operations
in space without interference. Purposeful interference -:. 'th space
systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sovereign rights.
The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its
rights of self-defense and thereby strengthen national security,
the deterrence of attack, and arms control agreements.
The U.S. will encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities and systems for economic benefit and to promote the
technological position of the United States.
The Secretary of Defense will establish a program for identifying
and integrating, as appropriate, civil and commercial resources
into military operations during national emergencies declared by
the President.
While the United States see'.cs verifiable, comprehensive limits
of anti-satellite capabilities and use, in the absence of such an
agreement, the U.S. will vigorously pursue development of its own
capabilities. The U.S. space defense program shall include an inte-
grated attack warning, notification, verification, and contingency
reaction capability which can effectively detect and react to threats
to U.S. space systems.
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APPENDIX B
IMPACT OF HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS ON SPS
Harry H. Holloway
Manager, Projects Staff
Vulnerability & Hardness Laboratory
Defense and Space Systems Group of TRW
Redondo Beach, California 90275
This discussion addresses the influence of natural radiation environment,
and of some weapon environments, on the performance of the Satellite Power
System. The discussion is generic, rather than system specific, in that it is con-
cerned with classes of effects on equipment of the type that would probably be
used to implement the Satellite Power System (SPS) design, rather than with
an assessment of the system itself. The weapon environments considered include
nuclear radiation from a weapons test, or an attack on another satellite, as well
as direct attack by an Anti-Satellite Satellite (ASAT) carrying pellet, nuclear,
or laser weapons. Effects are considered from the viewpoint of the payload (solar
array) as well as the vehicle-operating systems.
Natural Radiation
The natural radiation environments are the trapped-electron environment,
the solar flare proton environment, and the trapped-proton environment, which
all contribute to the total dose seen by the system. Current understanding of
these environments probably is best exemplified by the NASA AE-7 model for
electrons and the APBMAC and APBMIC models (also NASA) for protons. Exposure
to the total dose environments, for both the payload (solar array) and the vehicle
electronics, results in the gradual degradation of performance parameters. For
the solar array itself, this degradation would result in a loss of power output
of the order of 15 percent over 5 years in orbit. This kind of degradation is gener-
ally accounted for by including the end-of-life degradation in the initial design.
For the SPS the degradation allowance would be sized to the refurbishment cycle
time. Semiconductor devices in the vehicle electronics would be similarly affected,
the degradation ranging from insignificant for most diodes and small signal transis-
tors to potential catastrophic failure for some integrated circuit operational
amplifiers. Hardening techniques available include mitigation of the dose incident
on the parts by the use of added structural, box or piece part shielding, or by
determination of the radiation sensitivity of the pats by test in a simulated radio-
tion environment and providing for this radiation sensitivity in the design. This
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latter approach requires some degree of ongoing monitoring of production devices,
since the total dose sensitivity is very sensitive to manufacturing process changes
in some devices. Several device manufacturers are beginning to introduce lines
of radiation-hardened devices that should reduce this concern in the future.
Collateral Nuclear Effects
The baseline environment defined for the nuclear radiation levels arising
from a nuclear weapons test by another power, or from an attack on another
satellite, is the JCS guidelines level defined in SAMSU Exhibit 69-13 (secret).
For a synchronous satellite over the continental United States, the probability
of seeing these levels resulting from an actual test is very small. Radiation levels
resulting from an attack on another satellite will vary depending on the distance
from the nuclear event, except for the electron and electromagnetic pulse (EMI )
environments which are relatively independent of distance. The following dis-
cussion will be based on the distance specified in 69-13, and the levels, and the
effects will vary as the distance varies.
The principal impact of nuclear radiation on the Satellite Power System
will be in the solar array itself and in the seminconductor devices that implement
the vehicle electronics. The potential radiation failure modes are:
•	 Catastrophic failure, arising from the burnout of semiconductors
from X-r-iy induced photocurrents, or frorn electrical currents resulting
from X-ray illumination of the vehicle cables or structure. X-ray
illumination of the solar array itself at 69-13 levels will not result
in catastrophic failure of the array, but couild result in surges in the
primary power lines which could damage equipment connected to
those lines. Such surges can be eliminated by a combination of mitiga-
tion of the X-ray environment by the use of shielding by material
of high atomic number and by limiting the devices response by the
addition of limiting impedances in series with the power supply lines
to the affected devices. The efficacy of these protective approaches
will be valid for increases in the environmental level of 3 to 4 times
in most cases. The effects of electrical currents resulting from X-
ray illumination of the cables or structure may be eliminated by the
use of terminal protection devices (e.g., surge limiters, voltage clamps)
at component input/output circuits.
•	 Degradation, which is the same effect considered in the discussion
of the natural radiation environment, except that the environments
of concern are the weapon electron and neutron environments. The
weapon electron environment will be larger than the natural environ-
ment, but otherwise may be treated in the some way. The neutron
environment may not be shielded, but at the 69-13 level is too low
to be of concern to the large majority of parts. Degradation which
does exist must be characterized on the basis of tests on specimen
devices in a simulated neutron environment, and then allowed for
in the design.
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•	 Transient upset, which is the inadvertent switching or change of state
of digital devices when subjected to X-rays or System Generated
EMP (SGLMP). It is not a failure mode of concern to the solar array
itself, but must be addressed for the vehicle electronics. A typical
system response of concern would be the inadvertent firing of station-
keeping thrusters which could result in a change of orientation or
position of the systern. Hardening approaches for such effects include
the use of invulnerable devices (e.g., electromagnetic relays) or by
the use of devices that will not respond to the short weapon radiation
pulse.
ASAT Attack
The options available to conventional satellite systems for withstanding
ASAT attack include (1) hardening, in which the weapon impact is conceded,
but its ability to kill thwarted, (2) misdirection, in which the attacker's ability
to direct the weapon to the target is defeated, either by maneuvering of the
target or deceiving the attacker's acquisition and tracking system by decoys or
jamming and (3) counterkill in which the ASAT is shot down before it can do any
damage. The features of the SPS that dictate a survivability approach are its
large size and the large amount of power available to it. Hardening, whether
against pellet, laser, or nuclear weapons is not sufficient to ensure survival against
on attack, but it can aid the SPS's defensive posture by forcing on attacker to
corne in closer to fire effectively. Maneuvering and decoys are not feasible for
such a large system. Jamming the attacker's acquisition and tracking system
would be effective against today's generation of trackers, particularly in view
of the SPS power capability. More advanced trackers with home-on-jam capability,
or using long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) or optical data may negate this advantage.
Counterkill would appear to be a feasible survivability approach, particularly
with an on-board laser weapon which could utilize the SPS power capability to
fire at long range with sufficient power to destroy an attacker before he got
within range with his smaller weapons. Counterkill would require nn indPnonte
warning signal from a system such as the Satellite Attack Warning System (SAWS)
to be effective, but this should be available in the SPS time frame.
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